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Matovich: Criminal Procedure - The Evisceration of the Exclusionary Rule: T

CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-The Evisceration of the Exclusionary Rule: the
Supreme Court Invents the Oral Evidence Exception. United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).

For more than 65 years American courts have recognized the rule that evidence seized during an unlawful
search cannot be used against the victim of that search.'
In cases where the challenged evidence is obtained as a
direct result of an illegal search, there is little question the
evidence must be suppressed. Where, however, evidence
stems only indirectly from the illegal search, a more difficult question is presented. For example, where the name
of a witness is found in a file folder illegally seized, the file
folder and its contents probably would not be admissible
against its owner since it is regarded as primary, "poisonous
tree" evidence. The illegal seizure was a violation of the
owner's property rights in the file. But the testimony of
the witness whose identity was discovered because of that
illegal seizure may be treated differently. This sort of secondary or derivative evidence presents a quandary to a
Copyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming

1. This rule, commonly called the exclusionary rule, was first adopted for
federal courts by the Supreme Court in 1914 in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), and extended to secondary or derivative evidence
obtained in like fashion six years later in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). The Supreme Court held the rule
applicable to state courts as well as federal in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961). Although judicially created, the rule was viewed by the Court
as a constitutional measure rooted in the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
However, the Court no longer treats the rule as having a constitutional
justification; instead, it views the rule as existing solely for deterrence of
police misconduct. This view was first expressed by a majority of the
justices in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) and affirmed
in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). Not all members of the
Court agree with the majority's characterization, however. In a dissenting
opinion in United States v. Calandra, supra, at 356-57, Mr. Justice
Brennan chastised the majority:
This downgrading of the exclusionary rule . . . reflects a
startling misconception, unless it is a purposeful rejection, of the
historical objective and purpose of the rule . . . . (Clurtailment
. . was at best only a hoped-for effect of the exof the evil
clusionary rule, not its ultimate objective. [There was] no evidence
that the possible deterrent effect of the rule was given any attention by the judges chiefly responsible for its formulation. Their
concern as guardians of the Bill of Rights was to fashion an
enforcement tool to give content and meaning to the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees.
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court: Is society's interest in conviction so strong the testimony must be admitted? Would suppression deter future
illegal police invasions? Or is the evidence so tainted by the
illegal action that fair trial standards demand its exclusionis it the forbidden fruit of the poisonous tree?' This was the
question the Court faced in United States v. Ceccolini.' And
in its answer, the Court further limited the application of
the exclusionary rule by creating a new exception: that of
oral evidence obtained by law enforcement officials incident
to an otherwise illegal search and seizure.
The illegal invasion that spawned Ceccolini began when
a local police officer on a break stopped at a flower shop to
visit with a friend, Hennessey. Ceccolini was the owner of
the shop and Hennessey's employer. While there, the officer
spotted an envelope with money sticking out of it on the
cash register. Without a warrant, he inspected its contents
and discovered betting-policy slips. The officer asked Hennessey who owned the envelope; he was told it belonged to
Ceccolini. Thus, Hennessey became a potential witness,
found because of the illegal search. She was the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
The police officer reported the incident to his superiors,
who relayed the information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.' Four months later an FBI agent interviewed
Hennessey. Shortly thereafter, Ceccolini was summoned before a grand jury where he testified that he had never
taken policy bets at the shop. Hennessey was called as a
rebuttal witness, and Ceccolini was indicted for perjury.
Ceccolini's subsequent conviction was set aside by the
trial court on the ground Hennessey had been discovered
as a result of an illegal search. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but was reversed by the United States Supreme
2. Secondary evidence was first characterized as fruit of the poisonous tree
in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-341 (1939).
3. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
4. The FBI had been investigating suspected gambling operations in the
town, and had kept Ceccolini's flower shop under surveillance for a period
of time ending about one year before the discovery of the betting-policy
slips.
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Court in a 6-2 decision written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist.'
The Supreme Court held there had been sufficient "attenuation"' between the search and the testimony and Ceccolini's
conviction should stand.7
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

When the exclusionary rule was first adopted by the
Supreme Court, its blanket application forbid the introduction of any evidence which had been obtained directly
or indirectly from an illegal search. But as time passed,
the rule was diminished as courts found it difficult to exclude
secondary evidence that appeared removed from the illegal
action from which it was derived. One commentator noted
that if the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine were "limited
to confessions extracted by rack and screw methods as it
was decades ago, lower courts would have less trouble
excluding derivative evidence than they do today."' And of
all secondary evidence, the testimony of witnesses and
written confessions have presented the greatest problems.
Judges across the land seem to have a "visceral reaction"
to excluding oral evidence merely because the witness was
discovered by means of illegal police action
Three major exceptions to the rule have been recognized
by the courts: the independent source exception," the inevitable discovery exception," and the attenuation doctrine. 2
Even though evidence may have been obtained by an illegal
5. Joining with Rehnquist in the majority opinion were Stewart, White,
Powell and Stevens. Burger filed a concurring opinion. Marshall filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Brennan joined. Blackum took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
6. See note 12, infra.
7. United States v. Ceccolini, supra note 3, at 269-273.
8. Pitler, 'The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree' Revisited and Shepardized, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 579, 584-585 (1968).
9. Id. at 621.
10. The independent source doctrine is derived from Silverthorne Lumber
Company v. United States, supra note 1, at 392.
11. The inevitable discovery exception has never been formally approved by
the Supreme Court although it has generally been recognized among lower
courts.

LAFAVE,

3

SEARCH

AND

SEIzuRE,

A

TREATISE

ON THE

FOURTH

AMENDMENT 612, 617 (1978).
12. The doctrine of attenuation springs from Nardone v. United States, supra
note 2. It is based upon the supposition that at some point in time the
evidence may become so attenuated, so dissipated, that the detriment of
illegal police action does not warrant the cost of allowing criminals to go
f ree.
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search, it is generally admissible if the prosecution can
prove the information or the witness was discovered through
a source independent of the illegal invasion, or that through
the course of the investigation the information would have
been lawfully discovered, or that so many independent
intervening events have occurred that the taint has been
attenuated or diminished.
Before Ceccolini, no formal distinction was made between oral and physical evidence. In Wong Sun v. United
3 the Supreme Court officially recognized that words
States,"
could be as much a fruit of illegal invasion as physical
evidence, and it explicitly refused to draw a distinction
between the two.14 But the Court did recognize that a witness' intervening, independent act of free will, regardless
of police conduct, could attenuate the taint of the illegal
invasion.' It was under the attenuation doctrine that lower
courts began refusing to exclude the testimony of witnesses
discovered by impermissible state action.'"
THE CECCOLINI EXCEPTION

On its surface, the Ceccolini decision appears to be
simply another affirmation of the Wong Sun attenuation
doctrine. The Court found six separate factors in Ceccolini's
predicament that sufficiently attenuated the link between
the illegal search and Hennessey's testimony. They were:
(1) Hennessey's testimony was of her own volition and
was not coerced or induced by the police search; (2) the
13. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
14. Id. at 486.
15. Id.
16. The finding of attenuation was based on varying factors. In Smith v.
United States, 344 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1965), for example, the court said
the fact that an initially reluctant witness reflected, then changed his
mind, was sufficient attenuation to break the chain of causation. In
United States v. Scotten, 428 F.Supp. 256, 257 (D.Nev. 1976) the defendant moved unsuccessfully to suppress the testimony of an unindicted
co-conspirator as fruit of an illegal search. The court ruled the witness'
decision was "an independent act of free will" as "[h]e was concerned
with his own hide, not Scotten's and the possible admissibility of the
evidence at Scotten's trial was of no concern to (him)." In McLindon v.
United States, 117 U.S. App. D.C. 283, 329 F.2d 238, note 2, at 241
(1964), the court listed various factors of free will which would attenuate
the taint: (1) how great a role the manifestation of individual personality
played; (2) whether the witness would have voluntarily gone to the
police had they not known the witness' identity, (3) the fact the witness'
testimony never varied.
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betting-policy slips themselves were not used by the FBI
during Hennessey's interrogation; (3) substantial periods
of time had elapsed between the search and the interview
and between the interview and the trial; (4) the investigators had been familiar with Hennessey's identity and with
her relationship to Ceccolini prior to the search; (5) nothing
in the record suggested the policeman entered the shop or
searched the envelope intending to find evidence, let alone
a witness, and (6) application of the exclusionary rule
would not deter police in similar situations. 7
Substantively, however, the Ceccolini Court sharply
departed from Wong Sun. Although purporting to follow
Wong Sun, the Court ignored its warning of the danger of
distinguishing between physical and oral evidence. Rather,
the Ceccolini Court held that there was a logical distinction
between physical and oral evidence." The distinguishing
factor was the voluntariness, or free will, of the witness
whose testimony was the fruit of the poisoned search.19
The opinion noted that the "greater the willingness of the
witness to freely testify, the greater the likelihood that he
or she will be discovered by legal means, and concomitantly,
the smaller the incentive to conduct an illegal search to
discover the witness."2 And the Court cited with favor a
1963 decision2 ' of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
written by Chief Justice Burger which held that the fact
the name of a witness had been obtained illegally by police
was of no evidentiary significance: "The uniqueness of this
human process (of free will) distinguishes the evidentiary
from the relative immutability of incharacter of a witness
22
evidence."
animate
After recognizing a difference between physical and
oral evidence, the Court drew an even finer distinction
between testimony from both potential and actual defenUnited States v. Ceccolini, supra note 3, at 279-80.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.
Id. The Court did note its analysis might differ, however, if the search
were conducted for the specific purpose of finding witnesses.
21. Smith v. United States, 117 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 324 F.2d 879 (1963) cert.
den. 377 U.S. 954 (1964).
22. United States v. Ceccolini, supra note 3, at 277, quoting Smith v. United
States, supra note 21 at 882.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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dants, and mere witnesses. The Court said the "degree of
This
free will exercised by the witness is not irrelevant ....
is certainly true when the challenged statements are made
by a putative defendant after arrest . . . and a fortiori is
true of testimony given by nondefendants."' To further
bolster its conclusions, the Court noted exclusion of the
witness would be a serious obstruction to the ascertainment
of truth: "such exclusion would perpetually disable a witness from testifying about relevant and material facts,
regardless of how unrelated such testimony might be to the
purpose of the originally illegal search or the evidence discovered thereby."2
Other factors cited by the Court were that the degree
of free will necessary to dissipate a taint would be found
more often with live witnesses" and that the initial illegality
would very often have nothing to do with the witness'
willingness to testify. The Court also said the costs of
excluding testimony would often be greater than those of
excluding physical evidence; thus, a closer link between
the illegality and the testimony must be shown before exclusion would be warranted.27
AN ANALYSIS OF CECCOLINI'S EFFECT

Although the Ceccolini decision did not per se spell out
a new exception to the exclusionary rule,2" its effect on the
lower courts so far has been precisely that. By holding that
a witness' motive is always relevant,29 the Court equated
free will with attenuation and thus lessened the burden of
proof borne by the state for the admission of oral evidence.
For example, when the prosecution seeks admission of
evidence based on the independent source doctrine, it must
prove it obtained the evidence from an independent origin,
that the evidence gained in the illegal action did not directly
28.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

United States v. Ceccolini, supra note 3, at 276.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 278.
The Court appeared careful not to do that. Id. at 274-5.
Id. at 276.
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or indirectly lead to the evidence in question." If the prosecution seeks admission based on the inevitable discovery
doctrine, it would have to prove not only that another
procedure would have produced the evidence, but that the
other procedure actually would have been used. 1 But the
notion of attenuation or dissipation "attempts to mark the
point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police
action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule no longer justifies its costs. 32 Although
the prosecution still bears the burden of proof under this
exception, it only needs to show (1) sufficient free will and
(2) lack of deterrent effect, and the burden will be met.
Except for those very few cases where it can be proved that
law enforcement officials knowingly committed the illegal
invasion with the purpose of finding potential witnesses,
an awesome burden in itself for the defense, live witness
testimony now appears admissible, whether the witness is
a "putative defendant" or a "nondefendant."" The degree
of scrutiny involved, however, will vary with each classification.
In the first classification, i.e., testimony of nondefendants, the court's scrutiny will be considerably lighter than
that given to the testimony of potential or putative defendants. The first inquiry will be the degree of free will exercised by the potential witness. If the witness is a willing
nondefendant, as was Hennessey, admissibility is virtually
assured. 4 The Ceccolini policy that the exclusion of a knowl30. MaGuire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amendment and the
Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRIM. LAW', CRIMINOLOGY, AND POLICE SCIENCE,
307, 309 (1964).
31. Novikoff, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLUMBIA L. REV. 88, 93 (1974).
32. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (concurring opinion).
33. United States v. Ceccolini, supra note 3, at 276.
34. It should be noted that Ceccolini's attorneys did not classify Hennessey
as a "willing nondefendant," although the Court did. At pp. 18-19 of
Respondent's Brief, it is pointed out that Hennessey "answered Patrolman Biro originally after he confronted and interrogated her with the
illegally received evidence in his hands at a time and place where he
was in uniform, and she felt constrained by the circumstances to answer
his questions, but not to volunteer information . . . . [she did not, for
example, tell the officer about other betting activities, evidence of which
was also in the shop.] Hennessey further testified she answered [the FBI
agent's] questions because she knew that he had or could get the information which he inquired about from the North Tarrytown Police. . . . This
can hardly be construed as an act of free will divorced from the illegal
search." (emphasis in original)
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edgeable witness is a perpetual disablement, a "serious
obstruction(s) to the ascertainment of truth,"3 has neatly
set the stage for a blanket exception for willing nondefendants. As Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated in Michigan v.
Tucker," the strong interest of society in the effective
prosecution of criminals will be weighed along with protection of defendants' rights.
The Ceccolini decision mimicked the Michigan v. Tucker
balancing act with one of its own: "The penalties visited
upon the Government, and in turn upon the public, because
its officers have violated the law, must bear some relation
to the purposes which the law is to serve."37 The purpose
which the Ceccolini Court saw the exclusionary rule serving
was that of deterrence.3" As long as the proferred evidence
is gained by good faith police efforts-which are unlikely
candidates for deterrence-the testimony will in most cases
be admissible.
A case in point is United States v. Carsello.30 Names
of potential witnesses had been gleaned from records illegally
seized by the local police. Those witnesses gave government
investigators the names of other witnesses who could not
be considered potential defendants. Those witnesses were
freely willing to testify. The Court did admit that "in some
sense of the word the Government did 'exploit' the illegal
action of the . . . police by photocopying the usury records
and using them as a source of leads,"4 but it saw no deterrent benefit and thus no justification for suppression of the
oral evidence. The Government agents had not been responsible for the search that yielded the records, and the documents themselves were suppressed as illegal because of a
United States v. Ceccolini, supra note 3, at 277.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-1 (1974).
United States v. Ceccolini, supra note 3, at 279.
The Court did not explicitly list deterrence as the basis for the exclusionary
rule in Ceccolini, although it is implicit in the Court's rationale. However,
earlier decisions of the Court (Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) and
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)) held the primary justification
for the rule was deterrence of illegal police conduct, as was pointd out
by Mr. Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion in United States v.
Ceccolini, supra note 3, at 281.
39. United States v. Carsello, 578 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1978).
40. Id. at 203.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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technicality: everything seized was outside the scope of the
warrant. 1
The underlying problems presented by the Ceccolini
decision come not with the presentation of evidence in cases
like Carsello, but with the presentation of evidence in cases
where putative defendants-unindicted co-conspirators, codefendants and the like-are offered to the court as potential witnesses. Under traditional definitions of voluntariness
or free will, even "subtly coercive police questions" must be
taken into account,4" although little account has generally
been taken where the questions are merely "subtly coercive."
Attempts by the Court in the past to set forth a litmuspaper test for voluntariness have not resulted in any set
standard. The Court has recognized that "kindess, cajolery,
entreaty, deception, persistent cross-questioning, even phyical brutality"43 in the form of police interrogation is an
indispensable element in crime detection,44 and have refused
to hold that confessions obtained by these methods were
involuntary. But courts grappling with the Ceccolini decision have taken the meaning of voluntariness several steps
further in order to give effect to the Ceccolini mandate that
even putative defendants' testimony should be excluded "with
much greater reluctance"" than inanimate evidence.
An extreme example is found in United States v. Houltin,4 a case that at least superficially would be a likely
candidate for evidence suppression as a deterrent to illegal
police action. The six defendants in Houltin were convicted
of conspiracy to import and possess marijuana. The conictions of two defendants, Houltin and Phillips, were reversed by an appellate court because of the use of illegal
wiretaps in the investigation. But the convictions of the
others were upheld because they lacked standing to challenge
the illegally obtained evidence. Upon retrial, the evidence
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973).
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1961) (concurring opinion).
Id.
United States v. Ceccolini, supra note 3, at 280.
United States v. Houltin, 566 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1978) (decision entered
prior to Ceccolini; however, rehearing denied after Ceccolini).
47. Id. at 1038 (dissenting opinion).
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obtained by the illegal methods was suppressed, but the
other defendants were granted immunity to testify and did.
On the second appeal, the convictions of Houltin and Phillips
were affirmed, because the appellate court decided the testimony of the four codefendants had been voluntary. Sufficient "free will" on the part of the witnesses was found in
two factors: (1) the witnesses came forward on their own
volition and (2) the witnesses had been completely uncooperative when originally discovered but later changed
their attitudes and came forward to testify.48 The court
acknowledged, but otherwise ignored the facts that had the
four refused to testify they would have risked being cited
for contempt and adversely affected their chances for sentence reductions.49 The "choice may have been hard," the
court said, "but it was a choice nonetheless." 5
Another example of the same sort of questionable finding of free will is found in Commonwealth v. Caso,51 where
the testimony of an unindicted coconspirator who was
granted immunity was suppressed at the trial court. The
appellate court remanded the case for reconsideration of
the admissibility of the testimony, directing that "a truly
voluntary decision by a witness to testify should not be
overridden unless the extreme circumstances of a particular case require the suppression of the testimony as a
conduct which
deterrent to further resort to the unlawful
'5 2
resulted in the discovery of the witness."
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1032
Id.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Case, 385 N.E.2d 979 (Mass. 1979).
Id. at 982. See also: United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
where the testimony of a witness who had been discovered as the result of
an illegal search was suppressed. The witness testified only after receiving
immunity; the Scios court suppressed that tstimony on the basis it was
the product of coercion. Id. at 961. Disturbing, however, were the dissenting opinions. One judge would have admitted the testimony because
he felt the FBI agent who conducted the illegal search "had acted in
good faith." Id. at 978. Another urged the traditional analysis be thrown
He said the proper
out where live witness testimony was involved.
question was only "whether the deterrence benefits of excluding livewitness testimony outweigh the social costs of such exclusion." Id. at
984-5; United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978), where disagreement about the proper scope of the exclusionary rule resulted in
the court hearing the case en banc. The majority relied upon Ceccolini
to suppress the testimony of two witnesses, holding that they had been
discovered as a result of a search having no purpose other than their discovery, id. at 542, and that the witnesses' presence at the trial could hardly
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Of course, free will is not always defined in so broad
3 the Arizona Supreme
a fashion. In State v. Washington,"
Court ruled that an allegation that a codefendant had
agreed to testify against partners in crime because of a
favorable plea agreement offered by the state was sufficient
to cast doubt upon the extent of free will the codefendant
exercised."
But the occasions on which courts have already seen
fit to apply a looser free-will standard point to a widening
chasm between the considerations in admission of witness
testimony and those for physical evidence. If the definitions
of free will used by the Houltin and Caso courts stand, a
per se rule of admissibility of live witness testimony 55
appears inevitable.
THE DEMISE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The notion of differentiating between oral and physical
evidence for purposes of applying the exclusionary rule has
no logical basis."6 The reasoning used by Mr. Justice Rehnquist to qualify the decision could just as easily be applied
to physical evidence. For example, exclusion of physical
evidence would "disable" that evidence just as surely as
would exclusion of testimony disable a witness. 7 As the
majority opinion noted, police who know a witness can be
discovered by legal means will have no incentive to find that
witness by illegal means."8 But the same can be said about
physical evidence which is discoverable by legal means.
Other telling criticisms of the distinction were made
by the dissent of Justices Brennan and Marshall, who char-

53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.

be said to be voluntary or resulting from detached reflection since they
had been kept in custody from the date of the arrest until trial. Five judges
dissented, however, on varying grounds, one because "Live swearers under
severe cross examination had the truth to tell." Id. at 543.
State v. Washington, 120 Ariz. 229, 585 P.2d 249 (1978).
Id. at 254.
Blanket admissibility was advocated by Chief Justice Burger in United
States v. Ceccolini, supra note 3, at 280.
As Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joined, noted in
his dissent: "I do not believe that the same tree, having its roots in an unconstitutional search or seizure, can bear two different kinds of fruit, with
one kind less susceptible than the other of exclusion on Fourth Amendment
grounds." Id. at 288.
See United States v. Ceccolini, supra note 3, at 277 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 276 (dissenting opinion).
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acterized the special live-witness exception as a "form of
judicial 'double counting,' ""' which employed two exceptions to solve one problem.
But the most frightening characteristic of the Court's
free will analysis is that it too easily misdirects attention
from the central meaning of the exclusionary rule: that of
protection of the constitutional rights of the defendant. It
is the defendant's constitutional rights, not necessarily
those of the prospective witness, with which the courts
must be concerned. The defendant is the only individual
who can waive those constitutional rights, no matter how
much "free will" a potential witness may have to incriminate
him. The underlying principle of the exclusionary ruleand its primary justification-was the effectuation of
Fourth Amendment rights by the deterrence of police conduct that violates those rights."0 It would seem axiomatic
that police officers who know that testimony of witnesses
discovered by illegal means will not be suppressed will
redirect the thrust of all questionable searches to the discovery of "live" evidence which might have the "free will"
to be admissible. If it is the Court's position, as it most
certainly appears to be, that this sort of deterrence is no
longer necessary in this society, the basis for the exclusionary rule will crumble, and with it, the application of
the rule in more and more situations.
The author of the opinion, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, supports the total abolition of the exclusionary rule, albeit in
favor of some other protection. In a recent dissent to an
0 ' Mr.
Order in a Pending Case, California v. Minjares,
Justice Rehnquist advocated precisely that. He noted that
there was no question police need rules, as there was equally
no question that those whose constitutional rights were infringed should have an avenue for redress. But Rehnquist
said it was not at all necessary that the forum for redress
59. Id. at 287 (dissenting opinion).
60. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), at 482, 486.
U.S.
, 100 S.Ct. 9 (1979).
61. California v. Minjares,
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of rights and the forum for the police officer's education
need be one and the same."2
CONCLUSION

In his concurring opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Burger
advocated a per se rule of admissibility for live witness
testimony. And, as the dissenting opinion pointed out, there
is no real difference in the reasons the Court put forth for
admitting live witness testimony than there is for admitting
physical evidence. With only two justices opposed to the
new limitations on the rule, and with no real difference
between oral and physical evidence, the next exception to
the rule would reasonably involve certain types of physical
evidence. As the number of exceptions grows, the strength
of the rule fails. Its total demise is surely within the foreseeable future, albeit by a slow whittling at each edge.
CAREY

E. MATOVICH

62. Id. at 3118.
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